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Abstract: This article examines two aspects of neo-authoritarianism. The first is mainly diagnostic and 
concerns the nature of authoritarianism as a phenomenon of transition. The article investigates tensions 
and conflicts between temporalities. It pays attention to the asynchronous nature of change which, 
alongside the social structural level of changes, also the psycho-social level, intervene politically in 
different forms. There are social strata that are strangers in their own country and do not share the 
same present with others. For them, looking to the past is the only way to imagine a different future. If 
they are looking for values and authority, the neoconservatives fill the lack of authority with more power 
and replace the liquidation of old values with identity grounded on racism, nationalism, religion. By 
eroding the social cement that should keep society together, neoliberalism has also created room for 
compensatory phenomena, such as the need for community, authority, and politics. Understanding 
these needs constitutes the second, predominantly prognostic, part of this article’s analysis. 
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Neo-Authoritarianism without Authority 
 
A wave of authoritarianism is back. And will come back again. Authoritarianism re-emerges from a layer 
of modernity in which old and new elements in a state of tension are combined. When this tension 
increases, the social and emotional temperature of entire sections of society also rises. Authoritarianism, 
old and new, is not a regressive phenomenon. It is not even a parenthesis or unfortunate accident, as 
Croce and Meinecke described Fascism and Nazism. Rather, it is a phenomenon with revolutionary traits, 
an attempt to respond, or at least to react, to open issues of modernity. It could be said that it is the 
wrong answer to right questions. 
In this article, I intend to examine two aspects of neo-authoritarianism. The first is mainly diagnostic 
and concerns the nature of authoritarianism as a phenomenon of transition. First of all, one has to 
understand what is “new” in neo-authoritarianism. I intend to investigate it in the intersection of a long- 
and short-term temporalities, specifically, the intrinsic authoritarian nature of the modern state and the 
present conjuncture, respectively. It is this combination of long and short temporalities that 
characterizes the return of authoritarianism but in a new form. Indeed, whenever authoritarian 
governments appear, they emerge from a different economic and political junction and therefore, with 
new clothes. Neo-authoritarianism has neither fascist black shirts nor the Nazi’s brown-shirts. It would 
be misleading to try to understand the neo-authoritarian phenomenon by focusing on some groups that 
exhibit the swastika. If historical fascism and communism represented alternative forms of collectivity 
at war with each other, then today, atomization, isolation, desocialization, depoliticization, and 
fragmentation of experience are the basis of new needs for community and identity. Neoconservatives 
satisfy these needs by appealing to the nation against immigrants, to the Western Judeo-Christian 
tradition against Islam, to traditional family against deracination and further atomization. 
One could say that neo-authoritarianism arises from neoliberalism, in part as its rib, in part as a 
reaction. Neoliberalism has privatized entire strata of civil society, creating further atomization of the 
social and the erosion of existing authority. In the name of individual rights and liberties, it has 
individualized collective bargaining, de-collectivized political practices, and smashed any collective 
subject that is a perceived threat into individual atoms. Neoliberalism thus produced a depoliticization 
of the social, which is increasingly surveilled and controlled in order to guarantee the security and the 
private affairs of its members. By eroding the social cement that should keep society together, 
neoliberalism has also produced compensatory phenomena, such as the need for community, authority, 
and politics. Understanding these needs constitutes the second, predominantly prognostic, part of this 
article’s analysis.  
Neo-authoritarian movements respond to these needs for community and identity in a simple but 
immediate and effective way: nation, family, xenophobia. The nation provides some sense of belonging, 
the family offers some structure in the patriarchal order, and xenophobia offers identity through the 
opposition between ingroup and outgroup. In all these phenomena, the need for politics is crucial. And 
this is where neoliberalism turns into neo-authoritarianism. If the former depoliticizes the social, the 
latter repoliticizes it. If one wants to change the direction of the ongoing repoliticization, one has to see 
how it works.  
At the end of her book In the Ruins of Neoliberalism, Wendy Brown wrote that “Nation, family, 
property, and the traditions reproducing racial and gender privilege, mortally wounded by 
deindustrialization, neoliberal reason, globalization, digital technologies, and nihilism, are reduced to 
affective remains. To date, these remains have been activated mostly by the Right” (187-188). Brown’s 
book ends with the question: “What kinds of Left political critique and vision might reach and transform 
them?” (188). The answer to this question belongs to the domain of political practice. This article aims 
to draw a horizon in which that question can be rephrased and an answer may be possible.   
If neoliberalism has eroded traditional terms such as family for the sake of private individual rights, 
collective authority for the sake of market power, national identity and borders for the sake of economic 
globalization, then the neoconservative right has grasped and reanimated them politically and 
emotionally. Not only those, but terms like religion, which the left has abandoned in the name of 
secularism and laïcité, tradition, which has been abandoned in the name of progress, authority, which 
has been abandoned in the name of juridical equal rights and state sovereignty, have all been 
appropriated by the right. Neoconservatives in the USA, Poland, Italy or Hungary present themselves 
as protectors of Western civilization. They use the term West not as an essentialist concept, but rather 
as a performative term that produces polemical identity. It is used as an umbrella concept that replaces 
and reconfigures the identity of the western bloc that was used during the Cold War. In doing this, the 
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neoconservatives appropriate and monopolize the term West. When opponents of neo-authoritarianism 
attack the “West” as being white and predominantly Christian, as patriarchal and fundamentally based 
on colonial exploitation, they provide the neoconservatives with the raw material to define Western 
identity as a monolithic and homogeneous bloc. The right uses these identity-terms to provide a sense 
of belonging to be proud of. By doing this, the right offers one great tradition, i.e., the dominant Western 
one. 
The critique of Eurocentrism and the colonial origin of the modern West is correct only if it also pays 
attention to internal colonialism which, with the violence of the state and the capitalist mode of 
production, has repressed and cancelled the many alternative trajectories and traditions that have 
sought to give modernity a different orientation. There are other Western traditions—the insurgency of 
the German peasants of 1525 massacred by Luther and the German princes; the English Diggers of 
1649 disintegrated through enclosures; the French Sans-culottes of 1793 repressed by the Jacobin’s 
edification of the nation-state; the workers-councils of 1919 smashed by the Social Democrats in power, 
etc. These examples are part of countless attempts to give Western modernity a different direction. For 
this reason, Europe and the West as a set of values do not exist. Europe is a stratified set of different 
trajectories and roads left interrupted. To forget them means to kill those insurgents once again. The 
term West is a battlefield. And so are terms like tradition, religion and authority, which the right has 
collected, monopolized, and used as weapons in the making of an authoritarian carrier.   
 
Authoritarian Times  
The Left has often paid little attention to the asynchronous nature of social transformations. This is what 
Ernst Bloch reproached the communists for in an article written in 1932. He observed, “Not all people 
exist in the same Now. They do so only externally, by virtue of the fact that they may all be seen today.  
But that does not mean that they are living at the same time with others” (Bloch, “Nonsynchronism” 
22).1 There are social strata that have been left behind in the process of modernization. These strata 
express their dissatisfaction with the present by looking back, towards a better past. Bloch captured the 
potential of this nonsynchronism. He observed, “Believing, obeying, struggling, are those the fascist 
virtues? - perhaps, but for many, obeying is the best virtue they have. Order and hierarchy, do they 
make up the fascist architectural style? - perhaps, but many are looking for quiet in the order, for a job 
in the hierarchy. Yes, national-socialist agitation has been called an appeal to the inner scoundrel in 
man, and rightly so” (28). In order to dig into the “inner scoundrel in man,” it is useful to combine an 
analysis of social strata with one of psychological strata. But one must also bear in mind that the 
scoundrel is inside each human being. For this reason, instead of stigmatizing entire strata of the 
population, it is important to recognize that the inner scoundrel can either play tricks on us or offer the 
opportunity to better understand what is going on in the Now. 
Ernst Bloch invites us to understand the authoritarian present in terms of temporal conflicts and 
transition. If this is the case, the outcome is open. We are stuck in a transition that has lasted centuries. 
At the moment, authoritarian movements have the reins in many places around the world and seem to 
be able to harness the tension that derives from the friction of different temporal layers. These layers 
flow over each other at different speeds, but in such a way that rapid changes at the surface generate 
intense frictions with the long duration of social, institutional and even psychological structures. The 
latter should not be ignored.  
In an old text that investigated the origins of Italian fascism, the author wrote that Italian workers, 
although neither stupid nor totally ignorant, were overpowered by a “political unconsciousness [that], 
far from making things easier, rendered a good Liberal government very nearly impossible.”2 Although, 
this consideration is inadequate and assumes the “good Liberal government” as the highest value to be 
restored, it offers the opportunity to combine the analysis of the transformations of economic and social 
structures with the analysis of psychologic transformations that can free the “political unconsciousness” 
or the “inner scoundrel.”  
Argentine sociologist Gino Germani interpreted populism in terms of a transition to new forms of 
integration, transition from tradition to modernity, where pieces of one and pieces of the other coexist 
 
1 For a recent mobilization of Bloch’s analysis in order to understand the emergence of new forms of right-wing 
politics, see Nilges. 
2 This is the entire citation: “If man is to be called a political animal, the labourers of Italy were not men fifty years 
ago. They did not care what happened and did not think they had anything to say in the matter: they were 
politically unconscious. Not that they were stupid: their art, their songs, their traditions attest the contrary. Their 
political unconsciousness, far from making things easier, rendered a good Liberal government very nearly 
impossible” (Lion 26; emphasis added). 
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and fight each other. Germani also maintained that the coexistence of “advanced” groups and “late 
groups,” generates a whole series of asynchronisms within the transformation processes (“Democracia” 
12-14; Politica 137). He suggested considering, alongside the structural level of changes, also the 
psycho-social level, in which groups rooted in traditional patterns, intervene politically in different forms, 
which can range from protest to revolutionary movements to conservative and religious movements. 
Paying attention to the asynchronous nature of change, in his analysis of fascism and authoritarianism, 
Germani observed that some social strata manifest the “impulse to recover the traditional way of life” 
as part of an “active propensity to reestablish the equilibrium between the psychological and the 
normative and environmental levels, which may involve a change in social structures (in its norms and 
environment)” (Authoritarianism 20-22). Germani’s merit is to highlight the political and psychological 
importance of anachronistic temporalities in the present, how they interact with the present, and can 
open it to different outcomes. 
Since the agents of change are human beings, one must pay attention to their cultural and 
psychological context. In his book The Mass Psychology of Fascism, Wilhelm Reich wrote that one has 
to deal with different layers of the biopsychic structure,” where “‘ideology’ changes at a slower pace 
than the economic basis,” so that “the psychic structures lag behind the rapid changes of the social 
conditions from which they derived, and later come into conflict with new forms of life” (xi,18).3 
According to Reich, “we are dealing with three different layers of the biopsychic structure,” which “are 
deposits of social development.” He distinguished between a “surface layer” characterized by social 
cooperation, an “intermediate character layer” that corresponds to what Freud called the unconscious, 
and a “third, deepest layer,” which Reich calls biological core (xi). For Reich, fascism is an expression 
of the second level, a reaction to the mechanistic character of the modern human being, while the 
political question and therapy from fascism would be constituted by combining the first level with the 
third. I am not interested in following Reich in the combination of these levels, but his intuition on the 
different temporalities of the strata deserves attention. At the end of his “Preface,” he wrote that “the 
social measures of the past three hundred years can no more cope with the mass pestilence of fascism 
than an elephant (six thousand years) can be forced into a foxhole (three hundred years)” (xxvii). 
Fascism finds its energy in the old, millennial, second stratum, still full of “rapacious and envious 
impulses” which, if freed, cannot be tamed by a few centuries of civilization (xi). The more the tension 
between these strata increases, the more the psychological and social pressure increases. And the “inner 
scoundrel” is free. 
Similarly, Carl Gustav Jung compared the human psychic structure to a building with many layers, 
with the unconscious constituting the oldest strata. Jung compares the human psychic structure to “a 
building whose upper story was erected in the nineteenth century, the ground floor dates back to the 
sixteenth century, and careful examination of the masonry reveals that it was reconstructed from a 
tower built in the eleventh century.” Jung continues the analogy by writing that in “the cellar we come 
upon Roman foundations, and under the cellar a choked-up cave with Neolithic tools in the upper layer 
and remnants of fauna from the same period in the lower layers.” For the psyche “there is nothing that 
is just a dead relic” (“Mind” 31). In an essay of 1941, Jung observed that “the breakdown of a tradition, 
necessary as this may be at times, is always a loss and a danger; and it is a danger to the soul because 
the life of instinct—the most conservative element in man always expresses itself in traditional usages” 
(“Psychotherapy” 29). The point is that the very rapid changes taking place at the level of culture and 
consciousness do not find a correspondence in the deepest strata of the psyche, produced over hundreds 
of thousands of years. The result is a tension between these strata, and the more this tension increases, 
the more the psychological and social pressure increases and old structures struggle against the new 
ones. 
If the compass of traditions, habits, and authority fails, the risk is that “the conscious mind becomes 
severed from the instincts and loses its roots, while the instincts, unable to express themselves, fall 
back into the unconscious and reinforce its energy, causing this in turn to overflow into the existing 
contents of consciousness” (“Psychotherapy” 29). The tension between the strata puts the building built 
in the last thousands of years at risk of collapsing. And if this building, i.e., the psyche, collapses, what 
are the consequences, individually and collectively? For Jung, “in dealing with the individual, no matter 
how revolutionary his conscious attitude may be, we have to reckon with a patriarchal or hierarchical 
orientation of the psyche which causes it instinctively to seek and cling to this order” (30). The individual 
 
3 In Character Analysis, by describing the psychological impact of the Soviet collectivization on Russian peasants, 
Reich writes: “The role played in these difficulties by the dissolution of the family through the collectives and, 
above all, through the revolutionary change in sexuality can be roughly understood from the literature on this 
subject. The old structures not only lag behind; they struggle against the new in many different ways” (xxvii). 
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tries to face the horror vacui produced by the loss of order and authority by clinging to any authority. 
In this sense, one could say, authoritarianism is an Ersatz, a replacement and compensation for the loss 
of authority. And again, the “inner scoundrel” takes over. 
Eventually, it is necessary to investigate the kinds of contemporary structural transformations that 
are underway and how old analyses of fascism can be useful today. On a global scale, the temporal 
disjuncture between national and transnational institutions is increasing, and the “slower temporal 
rhythms of nation states are marginalized by the transnational proliferation of soft law and fast policy” 
(Hope 79). As I observed in an article published in 2014, “the speed of formal democracy, with its 
parliamentarian discussions and search for consent, is too slow in comparison to the speed and needs 
of capital” and, especially, financial capital (“Clash” 353-366). The two temporalities, i.e., the state and 
the financial market, are becoming incommensurable. For this reason, one can observe that the same 
authoritarian project, at least in constitutional terms of accelerating the decision-making process, has 
been pursued by both right- and left-wing governments. Moreover, the acceleration of decision-making 
processes goes together with their depersonalization. An increasing number of decisions are made by 
an elite of technocrats at institutional levels, which are totally beyond population's control. This increases 
individuals’ sense of powerlessness.  
Even the most trivial notion of democracy cannot survive this synchronization with the market. This 
temporal conflict implies that decisions must be made quicker, usually through executive orders; slow, 
formal democratic procedures must be bypassed; consent must be won at the speed of social media 
and not in long and interminable conversations; complexity produced by globalization processes must 
be simplified by recalling the primordial functions of the state: security, control, borders. By doing this, 
neo-authoritarian leaders, in a way that retrieves historical fascism, are attempting a 
new synchronization of different temporalities. The reasoning goes back to Bloch’s analysis. In Germany, 
the strength of National Socialism, like that of recent right-wing populisms, consisted in using and 
making manifest the tension between non-synchronic social strata and reorienting that tension to 
synchronize the country. The term used by Nazis was Gleichschaltung, which can be understood and 
translated as “switching onto the same track.” This operation, accomplished through a series of 
legislative acts (Gleichschaltungsgesetze), aimed at producing a new level of legal, political, social, and 
cultural integration. Whoever did not adapt, or preferred non-adaptation, was “switched off.”  
If one combines the political, social, economic, and cultural dimensions of today's analysis on 
authoritarianism, synchronization looks like an attempt to govern a state of exception that is both 
internal, i.e., psychological and cultural, and external, i.e., national and international.  
Today more than ever, one needs to be able to pay attention to the tension between temporal strata 
through which different social strata come into conflict with each other. The conflict between the city 
and the countryside, or in the USA between the blue coasts and the red interior, is not so much a spatial 
conflict, but a temporal one. Part of the rural population and the traditional working class feel left behind 
by modernization processes; they feel like strangers in their own land (Hochschild). A large middle-class 
stratum feels pushed downward by ever faster globalization processes beyond its control. Individuals 
feel disoriented and at the mercy of forces totally out of their control. There are social strata for whom 
looking to the past is the only way to imagine a different present. 
Today, large strata of the population and an atomized working class, which is the result of a capitalist 
offensive against large worker concentrations, find some identity in national belonging; they find some 
security in limiting the uncertainties of the global market through an appeal to national sovereignty; 
they seek a reduction in complexity by stemming the nation with demands for impassable borders. They 
do not vote against their own interests, as some have claimed; rather they identify the slightest remains 
of common interests in the right-wing call to the nation, to a collective identity, sovereignty, and borders. 
They hope that these can stem the insecurities of global markets better than cosmopolitanism does in 
words.  
In his analysis of the psychosocial roots of fascism published in 1941, Erich Fromm spoke of a “feeling 
of individual isolation and powerlessness” (133) that throws the individual into a state of insecurity and 
anxiety and is compensated through “supporting factors.” These factors are found in national pride, in 
ethnic identity, in the family: “For those who had little property and social prestige, the family was a 
source of individual prestige” (121). Individuals find themselves isolated and insecure, and they make 
up for their sense of isolation in new and old ties by which they feel bonded.  
Today, it is a matter of identifying the composition of a new working class - often disaffected from 
the work it does—with new habits, characterized by a growing segmentation and atomization that gives 
rise to uncertainty and insecurity of employment, which makes any feeling of class identity evanescent. 
This feeling of dispersion, mobility, precariousness, loneliness is often subjectively unbearable and a 
cause of frustration. This working class has every right not to have confidence in the ruling class, in the 
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market and in globalization. An economic crisis, such as that of 2008, can dramatically worsen its 
objective living conditions. And no politician was, is, or will be able to predict when the next crisis will 
occur—or more importantly, to prevent it. 
Today, large worker concentrations are rare, at least in the West, and they coexist with a strong 
atomization of production processes, where a substantial number of workers work alone from home or 
in their cars. These workers represent themselves as their own bosses, even if their freedom is limited 
to the freedom to overwork themselves. Of course, if there is no boss who tells them when to start 
work, that does not mean that there is no boss, only that the boss has now been internalized. These 
new forms of work are not without discipline, but rather require a different discipline. Fordism gave rise 
to control over workers’ homes, their private and moral lives, in order to preserve their efficiency while 
they were at work. Today, private places and homes are often production units and home offices. The 
mass sociality of Fordism, certainly forced, but nonetheless sociality, has given way to a growing 
atomization and depersonalized society of the web, where individuals retain impersonal relationships. 
Today, there is a technological transition characterized by new media, an economic transition 
characterized by the centrality of financial capital, and a political-ideological transition characterized by 
ongoing global processes. The end of the Cold War, and therefore of a world organized in familiar bipolar 
terms, has deprived the West of its enemy. It also gave way to different possible scenarios. On the one 
hand, there has been a cosmopolitical route characterized by US hegemony, by the redefinition of human 
rights as a legitimizing tool for international police operations, by the “responsibility to protect,” and by 
Western “democracy” to export. On the other hand, another paradigm emerged. It is oriented toward a 
multipolar system that is characterized by “a world of renewed sovereignty, resurgent religion, 
globalized markets, and the stagnation or rollback of universal norms about human rights.” In this new 
system, which Stephen Hopgood calls “neo-Westphalian world,” the old normative package used to 
define what is “normal,” “democratic,” or “appropriate” is no longer adequate to provide answers (166).  
One could say that the entrance into the international arena of other actors quickly marked the 
inadequacy of the unipolar paradigm. The cosmopolitan path has come to an end, and national 
sovereignty has folded back on itself—but in a new way. “America first,” “France for the French,” “Italians 
first,” and “Hungary first” do not represent a historic inversion but do express neo-authoritarian 
governments as forms that are highly adequate to the present transition. At the same time, the principle 
of the “supreme emergency exception,” (Rawls 99) previously celebrated in the field of international 
law, is now largely used in each country to justify executive power’s decisions. 
The difference between yesterday’s fascism and today’s authoritarianism lies in the configuration of 
temporal conflicts that have taken on a new, unprecedented global configuration. As we have seen, the 
outcome of this clash of temporalities is the collapse of liberal democracy. Today the question is not to 
fix democratic procedures or to strengthen representative democracy. That can be done and can even 
work for short periods. But a new wave of authoritarianism will return to question everything again. It 
is therefore better to imagine different democratic practices starting from the numerous political and 
social experiments of recent years.4 It is better to regain possession of political terms dropped by the 
left and picked up by the populist right. Better to consciously use the force of anachronisms that are 
released in social transformations and transition phenomena—before they are used to legitimize new 
violent synchronizations. 
 
On the Political Use of the Past 
From the current unsustainable situation of isolation, atomization, and depoliticization, a desire for 
politics arises.  The right has been able to give it voice, even if it does so with deep ambiguity. On the 
one hand, the right continues the tradition of power that depoliticizes the social; on the other, it claims 
its repoliticization. Both the depoliticization and the repoliticization of society are particularly intense 
political acts. Indeed, as Carl Schmitt pointed out, the depoliticization, i.e., the withdrawal of the state 
from non-state spheres, requires a strong state and intense political action (“Starker” 71-93). Its 
opposite is the expansion of the state into distinct spheres of society, as exemplified by the welfare state 
that accompanies every individual from the cradle to the coffin. This dilation of the state is thus reactive: 
the more intense the conflict, the more extensive the state’s expansion. In other words, it is a state and 
administrative procedure for neutralizing the conflict. Based on the power relations existing in society, 
the state compromises with existing collective political subjects and yields room to collective agreements 
and social rights. This legal typology constitutes an anomaly in the grammar of the modern state. The 
Italian fascist corporate state, by integrating the dilation of the state and the repoliticization of society, 
 
4 I am investigating alternative democratic practices in my next book, tentatively titled The Democratic Excess. 
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tried to incorporate this anomaly, which eventually remained a purely theoretical project. Thatcher’s 
motto “society does not exist” removes the anomaly. For Thatcher, the political social reality articulated 
in a plurality of groups and collective actors had to be dismantled. The political decision to depoliticize 
the social coincided with the crushing of collective actors. That was the meaning of Thatcher’s war with 
the miners. The question is how to reanimate the fruitful anomaly. 
Neo-authoritarianism politically integrates neoliberal atomization processes with an intense 
repoliticization of the social by force of polemical opposition. I do not think a different kind of 
repoliticization should be pursued through other polemical oppositions. A third possibility is to look at 
the social as an articulation of political practices and institutions autonomous of the state. This means, 
at the same time, taking the need for politics expressed by large strata of the population seriously. 
Indeed, there is a deep need for politics at the base of neo-authoritarianism. There is a wish for change, 
but when this desire meets psychological and social obstacles, the energy invested in a possible change 
goes back to the subject and transfigures into a sort of “unconscious destructiveness” that can be 
channeled towards some Gegenbild, or counter model (Adorno, Authoritarian Personality 608). 
Individuals are thus pushed towards authoritarian solutions from a political and psychological impasse. 
Authoritarianism offers a Gegenbild, and with it a sense of individual and collective identity, a direction 
based on good, old, traditional (patriarchal) values. Authoritarianism offers an old, but always good 
commodity: hostility toward an enemy. This hostility redirects the course of the de-politicizing results 
of the “political revolution” by re-politicizing the social. This new conservative revolution dismantles the 
essential characteristics of the “political revolution.” In doing this, however, it endures the project of 
political modernity in terms of dismantling collective rights and collective subjects. In neo-
authoritarianism these collective forms are replaced by patriotism on the large scale and patriarchate 
on the small one. When the neoconservatives defend traditional family, the Judeo-Christian tradition, 
the Western and white identity, they do not defend these elements in essentialist terms. They use them 
as polemical concepts that activate counter-concepts capable of cementing forms of belonging. In the 
hands of conservatives, terms like Judeo-Christian tradition mean nothing else than opposition to an 
equally vague radical Islam or anything else that can trigger a real opposition. What matters is the 
opposition, not the actual content of its terms. 
Neoconservative leaders like to refer to the past. There is a common element that holds together 
Orbán’s call for a Hungarian future in the protection of Christian and national culture and Trump's 
patriotism in defense of Western civilization.5 By pointing to some future in the past, they provide a 
sense of continuity, tradition and stability in a society characterized by disruptions, rootlessness and 
instability. Neoconservatives, by claiming the presence of the past in the present, put history and politics 
back into motion and give them orientation.  And this is critical in times in which the present seems to 
be frozen and any compass useless. 
The modern Western dominant trajectory is characterized by a break with the past, which borders 
on its erasure. Descartes started by freeing philosophy from the weight of past traditions, Hobbes freed 
political theory from the authority of the Aristotelian tradition, the revolutionary bourgeoisie freed itself 
from the authority of tradition in the name of a radical break with a past of oppression and its humble 
origins. In this way, by destroying the authority of tradition, the presence of the past in the present was 
also destroyed, or at least basically destroyed. Only the future was still available as an alternative 
temporality to the present. The revolutionary bourgeoisie used the concept of progress to give meaning 
and direction to the present. They elevated progress to historical law. But this faith in progress was 
possible only until the philosophy of history was snatched from the bourgeoisie by the proletariat, which 
claimed a classless future for itself. At this point a deep skepticism about the future began, and the 
philosophies of history became—actually without changing much, if not the algebraic sign placed before 
the historical time vector—the philosophy of historical decadence. With the collapse of faith in the future 
and the break with the authority of past tradition, the present becomes temporally frozen. It expands 
to become eternal, natural, and metahistorical. Neo-authoritarian movements are also this—an attempt 
to rise beyond the sense of stuckness of the present by relying on the “authority” of a leader capable of 
smuggling in old values to quell an uncertain future. 
“Make America Great Again” expresses this move. If the present seems to be an unsustainable 
situation of uncertainty, isolation, and disorientation, and the future has ceased to be a politically 
available temporal dimension, what is left is the past as a vast political arsenal. The ability to appeal to 
 
5 In 2017, President Trump stated “The fundamental question of our time is whether the West has the will to 
survive. Do we have the confidence in our values to defend them at any cost? Do we have enough respect for our 
citizens to protect our borders? Do we have the desire and the courage to preserve our civilization in the face of 
those who would subvert and destroy it?” (“Remarks”). 
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existing traditions and to use the enormous charge of emotional energy contained in the past is certainly 
an advantage for right-wing movements. The left has abdicated from the past, and the philosophy of 
history that could mobilize energy from the future has collapsed.  
Conservatives grasp the essentials when they point to the past in the present. And since there is 
hardly anyone else to contend for that past, they use it as they like. The challenge, for another history 
and another politics, must be fought on the ground of the past. When neoconservatives claim they are 
defending the West and its values, they assume that the ‘West’ is a monolith. Paradoxically, their gesture 
mirrors the liberal dismissing of the ‘West’ because of its colonial heritage. De-westernization and re-
westernization are not real alternatives. Western history is layered with different political trajectories 
and is characterized by internal colonialism that has repressed and erased the memory of countless 
insurgent attempts to give rise to another political modernity. What I am referring to is the long tradition 
that connects the German peasants of 1525 to the Diggers, to the first socialists of the nineteenth 
century. For them it was a matter of practicing institutions and authority based not on “atomized voters 
abdicating their power,” but on “municipalities, cooperatives, and associations determining their own 
destiny in big assemblies” (Landauer 200). This tradition epitomizes the practical alternatives to the 
crisis of modern Western democracy. Forgetting these events and this tradition means not only killing 
the already massacred once again, but also breaking the continuity between present insurgencies and 
past attempts at liberation. It means erasing the presence of the past in the present and giving it away 
to the right.  
The past, its presence in the present, is the battlefield on which the struggle against neo-
authoritarianism can take place. It is a matter of seeing in the past, and in many local experiments of 
our time of transition, the already real presence of new forms of life in common that arise not against 
tradition and authority but by reactivating alternative traditions of modernity. This is how anachronism 
works politically.   
 
Old Terms for New Politics 
In Education After Auschwitz Adorno observed: “Often, for instance, in America, the characteristic 
German trust in authority has been made responsible for National Socialism and even for Auschwitz. I 
consider this explanation too superficial. (…) Rather, one must accept that fascism and the terror it 
caused are connected with the fact that the old established authorities of the Kaiserreich decayed and 
were toppled, while the people psychologically were not yet ready for self-determination” (194). Are 
we? In the present situation, it is not authority that gives rise to authoritarianism, but the other way 
around—the lack of authority gives room to authoritarianism. This statement has to be analyzed more 
thoroughly. One needs to look at authority, tradition and religion not as relics, but as temporal layers 
full of emotional and political energy. It is the merit of the criticism of the notion of progress and 
historical teleology to have shown that past formations should not be treated as stages in the historical 
progress, but rather as layers that carry contemporaneous relevance (Freyer 74). There are elements 
of novelty that emerge on pre-given strata of traditions, legal settings, theological interpretations, and 
institutional bonds (Koselleck 36).  
Over the past century, many traditional forms of authority have been questioned. They have often 
been confounded with forms of power, and this has generated confusion. I am referring to the authority 
of teachers over students, parents over children, and elders over youth. The dissolution of pedagogical 
authority in educational institutions, for example, has perhaps produced greater freedom and equality 
between students and teachers who abused their power, but it has also destroyed the authority of 
tradition and elevated students to customers to be satisfied, thus replacing the authority of the teacher 
with market power. The authority of the past is questioned: education no longer aims to construct a 
common language and respect for centuries of thought accumulated in interpretations and reflections, 
but aims at originality, which, sans tradition is an empty and bombastic phrase. Authority gives way to 
the power of the catch phrase.  
The dissolution of patriarchal authority in the modern family has produced greater freedom and 
equality for women, but it has also atomized family structures and left free access for state interference, 
ready to punish educational abuse and remove children from the care of parents unable to support them 
even just economically. The erosion of family authority opens the doors to state power, which intervenes 
in the name of individual rights, making arbitrary decisions that usually affect more poor and black 
families and can turn the household into a legal purgatory.6 It is useless to reiterate that it is often 
necessary to take action against abusive parents. That is not the point. The point is that whenever power 
 
6 See Goldberg.  
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intervenes in the name of security, the problem of the limit of this power of intrusion always arises. 
Historically, individual rights have been and are imposed at the expense of existing authority and 
collective rights, by virtue of the constitution of the state monopoly of power and the parallel erosion of 
local authorities. Their disappearance perhaps leaves greater negative freedom to individuals but also 
leaves them more alone, isolated and insignificant. The state does nothing but occupy, with its own 
power, the space left empty by authority. This is not the intention that drove, and drives, anti-
authoritarian movements, but sometimes it has that effect. When collective agency fails, there remain 
passive subjects, and at that point, to protect potential victims, power creeps into the interstices left 
empty by authority and finds new spaces for intervention.  
Conservatives have a point in criticizing the erosion of authorities in the social fabric. The authority 
of tradition and intermediate bodies has historically been a brake on the centralization of power. In 
these terms, the aristocracy resisted the nascent concentration of power of the absolute monarch. This 
is the story told by the aristocrat Tocqueville. He expressed the point of view of a class that was defeated. 
Early socialist workers’ associations, the true heirs of that aristocratic tradition, used their authority to 
limit the power of both the state and capitalists and, at the same time, to prefigure different forms of 
life.  
When, in 1987, Margaret Thatcher claimed that “there’s no such thing as society. There are individual 
men and women and there are families,” she was not giving a picture of the present but taking up the 
grammar of an old declaration of war. In the background was the UK miners’ strike of 1984-1985. In 
her declaration of war against society, Thatcher was imposing an agenda in which social atomization 
was at the same time pursued and compensated by the authority of the family and traditional values 
(Hall 70). At the same time, social cohesion was imposed from above by activating the temporality of 
the past in the form of the “return of Britain to greatness” (70). Thatcher, in those days, and many 
populist leaders today, have little to invent. On the one hand, they pick up the language of a long war 
against commons and societal authority; on the other, they claim to defend old values and traditions.  
Authoritarian forces have an easy game moving in the ambiguity that, on the one hand, strengthens 
state power and, on the other, refers to tradition and the past. That is what Reagan did in 1981, 
appealing to ‘old verities,’ or Thatcher in 1978 appealing to a ‘return to traditional values.’ Authoritarian 
forces take possession of the past by recalling old values. They strengthen the power of big government 
in the name of security, invent an enemy to re-solidify the social fabric and create a sense of common 
identity, pull religious symbols void of all meaning out of a magic hat. They make individuals more 
scared and insecure in order to sell them protection and security. They use the call for traditional forms 
of authority to strengthen central government and, at the same time, blame the left for expanding the 
power of big government. However, it is now evident that the common feature of neo-authoritarianism 
is the continuous practice of the state of exception to deal with real or presumed emergencies. When 
these emergencies disappear, if they disappear, an additional level of concentration of state power and 
the erosion of constitutional guarantees have been tested and achieved. This is how the state survives 
itself, by strengthening its primordial sovereign functions. When ‘conservatives’ attack big government 
in words, they actually reinforce authoritarianism and ‘decisionism’ as the real essence of the state. 
The grammar of authoritarianism is inscribed in the original language of the modern state and has a 
long history. Marx observed that modern political revolutions, the American and the French, “abolished 
the political character of civil society” and shaped the new, atomized member of civil society, the 
“unpolitical man” (Marx, “Jewish” 232-233). It is a depoliticization of the social through the erosion of 
authority and the disintegration of associations and guilds. The state becomes a guardian, a guarantor 
of security and order. Its function is to neutralize possible conflicts and to police the social. This control 
has now reached extreme forms. Public spaces are monitored by cameras; e-mail and online 
conversations are controlled electronically; and individual behaviors are micro-disciplined. Weber’s iron 
cage encircles the “unpolitical man” with increasingly tight links. This trajectory is inscribed in the 
grammar of modern power.  
The modern state was built by neutralizing local authorities and dissolving the very idea of auctoritas. 
One could say that the state stands on these rubbles. Today, when neoconservatives complain because 
of the lack of authority, what they really claim is more power. They are masters in confounding authority 
with power. The left has abandoned the term authority. The right-wing does nothing but collect and use 
what the left has dropped.  
The term authority is of Roman origin and recalls the original sense of augeo, not so much the act of 
increasing, as is often stated, but that of creating something new from fertile soil and of mediating the 
historical level with a level that is unachievable, and therefore not at someone’s disposal (Benveniste 
148-151). This clarification is important. If the discourse of power, especially in its revolutionary 
expression, is characterized by a break, by the introduction of a novum ordo seclorum, the discourse of 
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authority holds together and balances continuity and discontinuity. By mediating between the historical 
level and a transcendent one, authority presents its political plan as always unfinished, and therefore it 
needs the guidance of the past. Historically, in fact, the Roman senate received its authority from the 
past. Its position, as Mommsen noted, was “as something other and more than a mere state-council” 
(97). It had a binding force similar to the religious dimension, something that can be compared to the 
auspices of the augures—practices for deciphering divine will, the support, the approval or disapproval 
of human decisions. The Senate, without having real power, gave every action the authority of the past, 
thus acting as a political and temporal center of gravity. “Thus, this assembly of elders was the ultimate 
holder of the ruling power (imperium) and the divine protection (auspicia) of the Roman commonwealth, 
and furnished the guarantee for the uninterrupted continuance of that commonwealth and of its 
monarchical—though not hereditarily monarchical—organization” (99). What has to be highlighted is 
that the grammar of authority is completely different from that of power. Alexandre Kojève pointed out 
that “[e]xercising an Authority is not only something different from using force (violence), but the two 
phenomena are mutually exclusive. Generally speaking, one needs to do nothing in order to exert 
Authority. The mere fact of being compelled to call on the intervention of force (violence) proves that 
no Authority is involved here” (Kojève 10).7 When authority, to obtain obedience, needs to inspire fear, 
when it needs to threaten punishment, it fails and becomes power. Today, the difference between 
authority and power is almost unthinkable. 
It was Thomas Hobbes, in the 17th century, in the midst of civil war, who formalized the new 
grammar that subsumes authority into power. This erosion of authority constitutes the pillar of the new 
state-building. This is its new grammar:  the representatives act with authority only because they are 
authorized by the people, who remain the author of every act performed by the representative-actors. 
For this reason, Hobbes can draw the logical conclusion that “nothing the sovereign representative can 
do to a subject (…) can properly be called injustice, or injury; because every subject is author of every 
act the sovereign doth” (141). Having neutralized the auctoritas in authorizing an author with respect 
to an actor—which in the modern state is repeated periodically through the procedure of voting with a 
free mandate—the consequence is that “no law can be unjust” as the law that is made by the sovereign 
power is made in the name of the people, and therefore is “warranted and owned by every one of the 
people; and that which every man will have so, no man can say is unjust” (230). Seeing as people-as-
the-author is the people in their unity and totality, means that individuals, as members of the people, 
are also authors of the law, and for this reason they cannot declare what they themselves wanted to be 
unjust.  
In this way the tension (so vital in the Roman political and juridical system) between the auctoritas 
of the senatus and the potestas of the people, is eliminated. It is not the auctoritas patrum that makes 
a political action authoritative. Rather it is a constitutional mechanism based on the representation and 
sovereignty of the people, whose authority consists of authorizing the representatives on the one hand, 
and being symbolically the author of the acts of those representatives on the other. In the Roman world, 
the constantly open political question was how to make an action authoritative, hence the need for 
tradition as direction. In political modernity that question is foreclosed because every action of the 
representative has implicitly already been authorized by the people. Including the declaration of a state 
of emergency which, in the name of public safety, limits individual freedoms.  
Political modernity is a long process of erosion of the authorities existing in the social fabric. In his 
revolutionary manifesto, Sieyès, combining Rousseau and Hobbes, states that in the name of the 
common interest of the nation, each “fractional interest” is to be considered “a danger to the community” 
and corporate bodies as “the cradle of the most redoubtable public enemies” (154). During the French 
Revolution, a decree of June 1791 declared “unconstitutional, derogatory to liberty and the declaration 
of the rights of man” any attempt to reactivate workers’ craft or trade which make joint decisions. The 
reason for this was that the new French constitution was based on the abolition of any form of association 
between citizens of the same estate and profession, and any attempt to reactivate them was considered 
as the restoration of the corporations abolished by the Revolution.8 Le Chapelier, the author of that 
decree, in a session of the National Assembly clearly outlined the plan of attack against intermediate 
bodies: “There are no longer corporations in the state, there is no longer anything but the particular 
interest of each individual, and the general interest. It is permitted to no one to inspire an intermediary 
interest in citizens, to separate them from the public interest by a spirit of corporation” (Roux 194; 
Stewart 165-166). In this way, the revolutionary machine set in motion against the orders of the Ancien 
Régime continued to work as a giant stone-breaking machine, shattering local authorities, associations, 
 
7 See also Arendt: “where force is used, authority itself has failed” (“Authority” 92-93). 
8 On the decree of 14 June 1791, see also Marx (Capital 903-904).  
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corporations, and workers’ assemblies that constituted a plurality of forms of self-government from 
below. In these other layers of institutions and local authorities lies a political tradition alternative to 
the authoritarian state. It is here that the reactivation of the authority, this anachronistic term, acquires 
new meaning. 
It has been observed that “the revolutions of the modem age appear like gigantic attempts to repair 
these foundations [religion, tradition, authority], to renew the broken thread of tradition, and to restore, 
through founding new political bodies, what for so many centuries had endowed the affairs of men with 
some measure of dignity and greatness.” This last step offers the right starting point, even if Arendt’s 
almost ideological predilection for the American Revolution prevents her from seeing real alternative 
trajectories that run through history. She shares the narrative of the victors and presents the American 
Revolution as a successful example of the foundation of “a completely new body politic without violence” 
(Arendt 140). This narrative removes the slavery, the brutality of the Civil War, and the genocide of 
indigenous peoples. But it also removes alternative trajectories that have been blocked and forgotten 
by the winners’ narrative. There is not only a history, but also a political theory that has been written 
by the victors. There are instead alternative traditions that, like karstic rivers, flow underground for a 
long time, to emerge in a new insurgency that reconfigures the present and indicates alternative political 
trajectories. These many pathways constitute the fabric of society. What characterizes these political 
events is the combination of continuity and discontinuity, individual and collective, the attempt to 
reconfigure the relationship between authority, tradition, power, and even religion, if by religion one 
intends both transcendence and bond (religio). In the modern state, transcendence has been displaced 
at the level of the invisible unity of the nation, which becomes present through the political act of its re-
presentation.9 This is how the modern era of the deification of the nation began. Transcendence, or 
better, its shadow, has collapsed into the concept of a unified nation, and this is the Western tradition 
that neoconservatives venerate. Transcendence is no longer the unachievable level that orients actions 
and opens up the political order to change, as it was in its relation to auctoritas. Reanimating these 
deeper historical strata is a way to reach and transform alternative traditions, to see the past as a 
political arsenal for the present, to foresee different outcomes to the ongoing transition. To re-
appropriate the past and conceive it as battlefield for the present. 
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